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In the Supreme Court of the
State of Utah

UTAH SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, )
a corporation,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
CASE
NO.
vs.
10451
JAMES D. NUNLEY and MARY V. NUNLEY, \
his wife, et al,
Defendants-Appellants.
/

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE

This is an action to foreclose four trust deeds in the
manner provided by law for the foreclosure of mortgages
on real property.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The trial court granted plaintiff's motion for Summary Judgment against the defendants, James [). Nunley and Mary V. Nunley, his wife. The default of the re-
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maining defendants had previously been entered. The
trial court thereafter signed and filed its Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law and Decree of Foreclosure, including in said Findings and Conclusions a determination that
$10,000.00 was a reasonable sum to be awarded the plaintiff as an attorney's fee and granting judgment against
the defendants, Nunley, therefor. From that portioo of
the Decree awarding the attorney fee, the defendants, Nunley, have appealed.
RELIEI, SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendants, Nunley, seek reversal of that portion of
the Decree of Foreclosure permitting plaintiff an attorney's fee, and seek judgment in respect thereto in their
favor as a matter of law, and for costs of this appeal. Defendants, Nunley, fiurther request that this court remand
this case to the court below for further hearing to determine whether there was a deficiency or surplus monies
resulting from the Sheriff's foreclosure sale, consistent
with the opinion sought from this court.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Except in certain significant particulars, the respondent agrees substantially with the appellants' statement of
facts. Because of the significance of those particulars
which are either omitted completely, or are vaguely stated
by the appellants, however, a recital of tlhe facts by the respondent is considered neces.sary.
This action was instituted _by the plaintiff for the pur·
pose of foreclosing four separate deeds of trust on four
separate tracts of land in the same manner provided for
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the foreclosure of mortgages on real property, pursuant to
the laws of this state. Included in the prayer for relief in
each cause of action, was a demand for judgment for a
reasonable attorney's fee for the prosecution of the action.
The notes secured by the four individual deeds of trust
were each of a principal amount of $35,000.00 and contained provisions for the payment of interest and costs and
expenses of collection, including a reasonable attorney's
fee (R 1-37). The aggregate amount owing on the four
obligations as of the date of entry of judgment of fore.
closure was $141, 212.03, plus delinquent reserves for taxes
and insurance on said premises in the further sum of
$522.03.
After service of process upon them, tlhe defendants,
Nunley, filed and noticed for hearing in Salt Lake City,
two separate motions-one to quash service of summons
on Mary V. Nunley, and one to dismiss plaintiff's complaint for failure to join indispensable parties (R 41-45).
These motions, of course, necessitated considerable briefing and appearance by counsel for plaintiff, involving a
trip from Provo, Utah, to Salt Lake City. Said appearance wa.s in fact made on June 15, 1965, and arguments
were presented to the same judge who thereafter heard
and ruled upon plaintiff's motion for Summary Judgment,
and who signed the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law and Decree from which tms appeal has been taken.
Plaintiff's counsel was successful in his opposition to said
motions and they were overruled and denied by the trial
court and the defendants were given ten days in w!hich to
answer plaintiff's complaint.
Defendants, James D. Nunley and Mary V. Nunley,
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his wife, interposed their answer to the plaintiff's complaint thirteen days later, on the 28th day of June, 1965,
and , among other things, denied all the allegations contained in the plaintiff's complaint, thus putting at issue
the question of whether or not plaintiff was entitled to
judgment against said defendants for a reasonable attor.
ney's fee but not presenting any issue of fact as to what
constituted a "reasonable" fee.

Thereafter, the plaintiff, by formal motion, in writing,
moved the trial court for Summary Judgment against the
defendants, Nunley, (R 49-57) and submitted in support
thereof the affidavit of J. Cdllin Allan, Vice-President of
plaintiff corporation. The affidavit was appropriately received by the court below and served to establish the authenticity of the deeds of trust and promissory notes in
question and the amounts and legality of the obligations
represented thereby, as well, among other things, as the
entitlement of the plaintifif to judgment against the defend·
ants, Nunley, for a reasonable attorney's fee. Said affi.
davit was not controverted by the defendants, Nunley.

Pursuant to plaintiff's notice, counsel for the plain·
tiff and for 1lhe defendants, Nunley, appeared in Salt Lake
City, on July 19, 1965, and present.eel their arguments in
support of and opposition to the motion for Summary Judgment (R 49-50). After hearing oral arguments of coon·
sel for the parties to this appeal, the court asked both
counsel if the motion was then submitted (R 80). Both
counsel then affirmatively indicated that it was and the
court promptly ruled from the bench in favor of the plain·
tiff and granted plaintiff's motion. Immediately following
the court's ruling on the motion, ·counsel for the defend·

5
ants, Nunley, departed from the courtroom without raising any issue whatever as to what constituted a "reasonable" attorney's fee to be awarded plaintiff according to
the prayer of its complaint.

Counsel for the plaintiff, at

the same time, approached the bench and inquired of the
District Judge as to what amount the court would consider reasonable as an attorney's fee in said cause.

The

court then inquired of counsel as to what amount he considered to be a reasonable fee, whereupon, counsel advised
the court that under the minimum fee schedule of the Utah
State Bar and considering the amount involved and the
work expended in connection with the foreclosure, a fee
of $2500.00 for each cause of action, or a total fee of
$10,000.00 was a reasonable fee for the services of counsel in the premises.

The court then instructed counsel to

prepare Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and De.cree accordingly, (Supp. R) .

Pursuant to this instruc-

tion, counsel for the plaintiff prepared and, oo July 21,
1965, the court signed and filed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law providing, among other things, as follows:
"That said promissory notes and deeds of trust, and
each and all of them, provide that the makers thereof
will pay a reasonable attorney's fee in the event of
default in the payment of said indebtedness. That it
has become and is necessary for the plaintiff to employ counsel to prosecute this action and to foreclose
said deeds of trust, as mortgages. That the reasonable value of the services of counsel in this action is
as follows:

=='--- ------------
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First Cause of Action

$ 2,500.00

Second Cause of Action

$ 2,500.00

Third Cause of Action

$ 2,500.00

Fourth Cause of Action

$ 2,500.00

Total

$10,000.00

As Coo.clusions of Law firom the foregoing Findings
of Fact, the court found that the plaintiff was entitled to

an attorney's fee in the amount of $2500.00 for each cause
of action, or a total fee of $10,000.00, plus its costs of suit
expended in said cause. On the same date the court signed
and filed its Decree of Foreclosure in said cause and en·
tered judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against the
defendants, Nunley, for an attorney's fee in the amount
of $2500.00 for each cause of action, or the aggregate sum
of $10,000.00 (R 58-70).
The defendants, Nunley, at no time after the entry
of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Decree by the court, as aforesaid, mo¥ed the court, pursuant
to Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Proicedure, for a new
trial or to open the judgment, take additional testimony,
amend the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, or
to make new Findings and Conclusions and direct the en·
try of a new judgment for any irregularity in the proceed·
ings or for insufficiency of the evidence to justify the decision. Further, although counsel for the defendants, Nun·
ley, was present in court on the 19th day of July, 1965,
when Summary Judgment was granted in favor of the
plaintiff, he demonstrated no interest whatever in the ques·
ti.an of what constituted a reasonable attorney's fee or in
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the characte2· or regularity of the evidence elicited by the
court in determining that question, and made no objection
whatever to such evidence, but on the contrary, immediately departed from the courtroom upon the announcement of the court's decision. The first and only dissatistaction of the defendants, Nunley, with the court's decision
respecting attorney's fees and the sufficiency of the evidence to support the court's findings relating thereto was
expressed by the defendants' pending appeal to this court.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THERE WAS ADEQUATE EVIDENCE BEFORE
THE COURT TO SUSTAIN ITS FINDINGS OF FACT
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DECREE RESPECTING THE AWARD OF A'ITORNEY'S FEES TO
THE PLAINTIFF.

The pleadings of the defendants, Nunley, did not
frame any issue as to what was or was not a "reasonable"
attorney's fee. The only issue presented by the plead..
ings with respect to attorneys fees was the question of
whether or not the plaintiff was entitled to judgment
for a reasonable attorney's fee against the said defendants. The notes and the four individual deeds of trust
by which the notes were secured contained p~ovisions for
the payment of expenses of collection, including a reasonable attorney's fee (R 1-37). The affidavit of J. Collin
Allan, Vice-President of plaintiff corporation, filed in support of the plaintiff's motion for Summary Judgment and
appropriately received by the court below served to estab-

lish, among other things, the entitlement of the plaintiri'
to judgment against the defendants, Nunley, for a reason.
able attorney's fee. The saic:i affidavit was Jt:ot c:ontro.
verted by the defendants, Nunley, and for this reason was
suflf.icient in law to establish the plainti.l.f's right to the re.
lief demanded in the p:tayer of the plaintiff's complaint, including the award of a reasonable attorney's fee, and the
court so found.
Neither the defendants, Nunley, nor their counsel, at
any time, manifested any interest in the question of what
constituted a ":reasonable" attorney's fee, and did not, at
any time, frame their pleadings in such way as to m<ike
this precise question an issue in the case. They were only
concerned with the question of whetheT or not the plain·
tiff was entitled to any attorney's fee whatever.
It should be noted from the statement of facts that
the same judge who made the determination of the amount
of the attorney's fee awarded to the plaintiff and signed
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, accordingly, also
heard, considered, and passed upon the said defendants'
motion to quash service of sununons on Mary V. Nunley;
the said defendants' motion to dismis8 the plaintiff's com·
plaint for failure to join indispensable parties; and the
plaintiff's motion for Summary Judgment. He had before
him the entire file of the case including all exhibits and
affida'Vits received in evidence, by which pleadings no issue
of fact was presented pertaining to the precise question of
what constituted a "reasonable" attorney's fee. He was
aware of the am0W1t involved in the proceeding, Which ex·
ceeded $141,000.00; he was acquainted with counsel for all
the parties and familiar with their reputations in the pro-

fession; he \vas av,rare of and capable of evaluating the
complexities of the issues involved in the case and of the
performance of counsel in resolving those issues by virtue
of havir.g presided at hearings on three separate motions
before him. He was certainly cognizant of the minimwn
fee schedule recommended by the Utah State Bar Association and was not without experience in fixing fees in sitnilar cases. In addition, he elicited, received, and considered
the statements of counsel for the plaintiff to the effect
that under the minimum fee schedule of the Utah State
Bar and considering the amount involved in the suit and
the work entailed in connection therewith it was counsel's
opinion that the sum of $-2500.00 for each cause of &C'tliQR,
or a total fee of $10,000.00 was a reasonable fee for the
services of counsel in the action . Although these statements were not given under oath, neither were -they objectro ro nor challenged for regularity by 'COUl1Sel 1ior said
defendants either at the time they were given or by way
of a motion for a new trial.
This court, in the reported case of F .M.A. ,Finanoia'I
Corporation vs. Build, Inc., 17 Utah 2d 80, 404 P.ac .2d 6:70,
referred to in appellants' brief, ,acknowledged that wider
certain circwnstances the €'\'idence required to establish
an attmney's fee neied not be proved by sworn testimony
"because both judges and lawyers have special .knowledge
as to the value of legal services." It is submitted that
where the defendants have failed to make any issue by
their pleadings of what constitutes a "reasonahle" attorney's fee and by displaying no interest whatever in the determination of that question by departing from the courtroom when the very question is being presented far deter-
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mination, and by failing to object to the character or quality or sufficiency of the evidence presented and considered
on that behalf, they have rendered the detennination of
the question by the cotui on the basis of the factors within
his knowledge unobjectionable. Stipulation of the parties
is not the exclusive basis upon which such evidence may be
properly considered.
The court, either trial or appellate, is itself an expert
on tile question of the value orf legal services, and may consider its own knowledge and experience concerning reasonable and proper fees and may form an independent
judgment either- with or without the aid of testimony of
witnesses as to value. (Campbell v. Green, 112 F 2d 143;
Adams v. Brothers, 155 Kan 23, 122 Piac 2d 757; Johnson
v. Howard, 167 Mi~. 475, 141 So 573; Gulf Paving Company v. Lofstedt, 144 Tex 17, 188 SW 2d 155).
The trial court has wide discretion in awarding attor-

ney's fees to a prevailing party and the appellate court
should not disturb such award in the absence of a manifest
abuse of discretion._ (In re Smith's Estate, 162 Pac 2d 105,
108 Utaih 537).
In tJhe reported case of Mann v. Mann, 172 Pac 2d 369,
76 C. A. 2d 32, the court held that where a note sued on
provides for the payment of a reasonable attorney's fee,
the trial court may fix the amount thereof in its discretion,
without the introduction of direct evidence on the matter
and the ruling will be reversed on appeal only for abuse
of discretion. To the same effect are the reported cases
of Crocker v. Crocker First National Bank of San Francisco, 141 Pac 2d 482, 60 C. A. 2d 725; Sattinger v. Golden
State Glass Corporation, 127 Pac 2d 653, 53 C. A. 2d 133;

11
Elsea v. Br~me .Furniture Company, 143 Pac 2d 572, 47
N. M. 346; and St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company v. Charles H. Lilly Company, 286 Pac 2d 107.
The circumstances attendant upon the case now pending before this court are more in harmony with the cases
last a:bove cited than with the fact situation in the reported
casei of F. M. A. Financial CorporatiQD. v. Build, Ine.,
wherein a different result was reached.
POINT II
TIIE QUESTION OF REASONABLENESS OF THE
ATI'ORNEY'S FEE AWARDED TO THIE PLAINTIFF IN
THE COURT BELOW IS NOT REVIEWABLE BY THIS
COURT.
The record clearly discloses that no issue was ever

raised by the defendants, Nunley, in their plea.dings, as to
the question of what amount constituted a "reasonable"
attorney's fee. The court found, on the basis of the pleadings, exhibits, and affidavit of J. Collin Allan, the Vice-.
President of plaintiff corporation, which affidavit was Wlcontroverted, that the plaintiff was entitled to a reasonable
attorney's fee. This decision resolved the only issue framed
by the defendants' pleadings with respect to the award of
an attorney's fee. While the evidence received and considered by the court in the form of an unsworn statement
by counsel for the plaintiff expressing his professional opinion as to the value of the services rendered might have
been properly objected to at the time it was given, if counsel for said defendants had been inclined to raise such objection, this was not done and it cannot be said, therefore,
that the court did not have before it evidence of the value
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of the legal services in addition to that knowledge and experience already possessed by the court. Further, the said
defendants made no attempt, prior to initiating this appeal, to present objections to the court's finding on this
subject or to challenge the regularity of the proceeding
wherein the court made its determination, or to challenge
the sufficiency of the evidence to justify the decision, all
as permitted by Rule 59 of the Utah Rules orf Civil ProcedtITe. The employment of a motion for a new trial under the foregoing rule would have permitted the trial court
to open the judgment and take additional testimony, if he
thought it necessary, and to amend the Findings of Fact
and Condtisions -Of Law or to make new Findings and Conclusions and to direct the entry of a new judgment on the
is.sue of attorney's fees.
1

This court has made it a:bundantly clear that by fail·
ing to raise the objection and except to the rulings of the
trial court at the time of trial and also by failing to move
the court for a new trial because of irregularity in the proceedings of the court oc the insufficiency of the evidence
to justify the award of the attorney's fee which was an
~ue upon which the trial court was not given the opportunity to rule otherwise, the appellant cannot now obtain
a review of the identical question by this court.

The landmark case in this state on this question is
Law v. Smith, 34 Utah 394, 98 Pac 300, wherein the court
said:

"A motion for a new trial does not enlarge the mat·
ters that may be reviewed by this court, except upon
matters which the trial court could not, and did not.
pass on at the trial. These are specified in Section
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3292, and, in brief, are: (1) Irregularity in the proceeding of the court*** and (6) the insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict. In granting or refusing
the motion, the trial court may exercise a sound discn.ition which the losing party may invoke in the light
of the wlhole proceedings in the case. This court cannot exercise such discretion, but is ordinarily limited
to the review of specific rulings made by the trial
<..."'Ourt. * * * * If the trial court has passed upon a matter
in the course of a trial and an exception is taken or
is given by the statute, the ruling or decision made by
the trial court, if assigned as error, is before this court
for review on appeal If, therefore, a matter comes
up after the trial, or where some irreguladty in the
proceedings during the trial, or some of the matters
arise which are enumerated in the first five grounds
for a new trial to which we have directed attention,
they mUFt be brought to the attention of the trial
court by a motion for a new trial, and his ruling upon
them may then be- reviewed by this court. They cannot be reviewed otherwise, since the trial court cannot pass upon them except in passing on a motion for
a new trial."

The Utah case of Foxley v. Gallagher, reported in 185
Pac 775, followed with approval the case of Law v. Smith
and specifically applied that decision to a situation where
the appellant raises for the first time, on appeal, the question of the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the judgment. The respondent in that case contended that the
appellant was obliged to move the trial court for a new
trial as a condition precedent to prosecuting his appeal
even tlhough the appellant had, in fact, moved the court
for a directed verdict. This court took the position that
if the appellant had already moved the trial court for a
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directed verdict, it was not necessary for him to require
the trial court to repeat its error by ruling again on the
same question in a motion for new trial. Significantly,
however, the court went on to say:
"If, however, after failing to move for a directed ver-

dict, appellants had also failed to move for a new
trial on the grounds mentioned, respondent's contention would have been correct and amply sustained by
many of the authorities cited."

The court went on to quote from the opinion in the
case of Law v. Smith as follows:
"So, likewise, in case a party desires to challenge the
verdict of a jury upon the groWld that the verdict is
not sustained by the evidence, he must do so by a
motion for a new trial, w1.less during the trial he
raised the legal question involved by a motion for a
non suit or for a directed verdict. Unless he has presented either a motion for a non suit or for a directed
verdict, the trial court has had no opportunity to pass
upon the legal sufficiency of the evidence during tltc
trial, and cannot do so w1.less a motion for a new trial
upon tlhe ground of the insufficiency of the evidence
is presented to it. When, howev·2r, a motion for a
non suit or a motion for a directed verdict has been
made and ruled upon, the court has had the oppor·
tunity to pass upon the legal sufficiency of the evi·
dence precisely the same as upon a motion for a. n.:"'
trial, and hence the latter motion, for the purposes
of a review, may be dispensed with. In this way all
the orders, rulings, and decisions of the trial court.
whether made during the trial or on motion for a new
trial, can be brought before this court for review, and
on all of them the court need to pass judgment but
once. •••"

e
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In quoting the above portion of the decision in Law
v. Smith, the court, in Foxley v. Gallagher, approved the
foregoing language as follows:
"It is not necessary to interpose any explanation as to
the meaning of the language quoted. It is self-explanatory, and in the opinion of the writer effectually
determines the law of this jurisdiction upon 1Jhe point
in question . The decision in that case is clearly decisive of the question presented here, and as the court
as now constituted is in hearty accord with both the
conclusions reached and the reasons given therefor,
we feel both legally and morally bound to adopt the
rule there laid down as controlling in the case at bar."

Under the fact situation in tihe instant case, the issue
of the sufficiency of the evidence as to what constitutes a
"reasonable" attorney's fee was never raised by the defendants. Nunley, nor ruled upon by the trial court and a
ruling on that question c'OUld only have ·been made by the
defendants presenting a motion for a new trial, which they
did not do. Since this question has not been raised by said
defendants, and then considered and ruled upon by the
COUI"t below, it is not now subject to review by this court.
POINT III
IF THIS COURT, CONTRARY TO RESPONiDENT'S
CONTENTIONS, SHOULD DETERMINE THAT THE
EVIDENCE ADDUCED IN THE COURT BELOW IS
INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE FINDINGS OF
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DECREE ON
THE QUESTION OF THE AMOUNT OF THE ATTORNEY'S FEE, THE CASE SHOULD BE REMANDED TO
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THE COURT BELOW TO RECEIVE A[)DITIONAL EVI.
DENCE ON THIS SUBJECT.
The appellants have never challenged the ruling of
the trial court granting plaintiff's motion for Summary
Judgment aginst the defendants, Nunley. The trial court
had before it, as items of evidence, copies of notes and
deeds of trust which appellants admit, in their brief, contained provisions for the payment of costs and expenses of
collection, including a reasonable attorney's fee. The affi.
davit of J. Collin Allan, Vice-President of plaintiff corpo.
ration, established plaintiff's entitlement to a reasonable
attorney's fee and said affidavit was not controverted by
the defendants, Nunley. The only question, therefore, for
the trial court to decide was what constituted a "reasonable" attorney's fee in the cause. The statement of plaintiff's counsel of his opinion as to what constituted a reasonable fee in the premises, given to the court without
objection, is in this record. If that evidence, coupled with
the peculiar knowledge and experience of the trial judge
and his acquaintance with counsel, his familiarity with the
case and the performance of counsel in connection with
rulings on three separate motions before him, and his
knowledge of the recommendations of the Utah State Bar
Association relating to minimum fees is considered insufficient to support his Findings and Conclusions and Decree awarding to the plaintiff judgment for an attorney's
fee in the aggregate sum of $10,000.00, then this case should
be remanded to the court below for the taking of adcli·
tional evidence and the entry of amended or new Findings
and Conclusions and Decree relating thereto. Where the
evidence in an equity case is too indefinite to support the
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findings of the trial court, the cause will be ,rem.anded to
th(' trial court to take further testimony and the findings

will be set aside.

Elliot v. Whitmore, 8 Utah 253,

30 P

984.
To this same effect is the case of Mason v. Ma.son, 160

Pac 2d 730, cited in appellants' brief, as well as in the reported case of Jensen v. lichtenstein, 143 Pac 1036, wherein this court remanded the cause to the court below:

uo•to hear any competent evidence the parties, or
either of them, may offer upon the question of What
amoont should be fixed in this case as a reasonable
fee, and, after hearing such evidence, or any other
competent evidence upon that subject that the court
may call for on its own motion, to fix a reasona:ble
sum as an attorney's fee••••"
The court in the foregoing case also made this signi-

ficant observation:
"The trial courts, in each Q'i.Se, become familiar with
all the issues, know just what the facts and circumstances developed at the hearing are, and thus are in
a position to arrive at an intelligent and just condus' 1Ja re~3'jJ:Xting the amount that should be allowed as
the reasonable fee contemplated by our statutes. In
case, howeveT, the court has insufficient data upon
which to base a finding, or even though he has such
data, he may nevertheless, as pointed out ·in Kurtz v.
Sanitarium Company, 37 Utah 313, 108 Pac 14, call
to his assistance attorneys engaged in the practice and
take their judgment under oath respecting the amount
that would be reasonable in any given case."

11

18
CONCLUSION

Viewing the record in the light most favorable to the
appellant, the conclusion is inescapable (1) that sufficient
evidence was adduced at the trial, which when ooupk<l
with the knowledge and experience of the court and his
participation in all stages of the prnceeding, was sufficient
to support and sustain the Findings and Conclusions and
Decree respecting the attorney's fee. (2) By appeUants'
failing to move the court below for a new trial upon the
grounds of irregularity in the proceedings below or the insufficiency of the evidence to support the findings of the
court, the trial court was denied the opportunity to rule
upon the precise question now before this court on appeal
and under such circumstances that question is not now
subject to review by this court. (3) If this court, for any
reason should conclude (a) that the question presented by
this appeal is properly before this court for review and (bl
that the evidence upon which the trial judge made his
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and entered his
Decree awarding judgment to the plaintiff for a reasonable
attorney's fee, was legally insufficient, then the matter
should be remanded to the trial court for the purpose of
receiving additional evidence on this subject.
Costs should be awarded to the respondent.
Respectfully submitted,
ALDRICH, BULLOCK & NELSON
By V. PERSHING NELSON
35 North University A venue
Provo, Utah
Cowisel for Respondent

